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February 20, 1976
List 5, Sheet 2
No. 75-811
SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA

•

v.

PAIMORE
SWAIN
[Sup~rintendent]
v.

PRESSLEY
1.

,

SUMMARY:

Cert to CA D.C.
(Tamm+ 6;
Robb, dissenting)
Federal/Civil (habeas)
The question in this case is whether

23 D.C. Code§ llO(g) precludes review by habeas corpus of

- 2 .I

Article III court and, if so, whether 23 D.C. Code§ llO(g)
is constitutional.
2.

FACTS:

The &,_overnment seeks review, in a single

petition, of two cases.

Each respondent filed a petition

for a writ of habeas corpus in the Federal District Court
for the District of Columbia, seeking to review his criminal
conviction in local District of Columbia courts for violation
of the District of Columbia code.
issues

Each raised constitutional

Palmore a Fourth Amendment claim and Pressley an

effective assistance of counsel claim.

Each claim had --

according to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals -- previously

r

been fully litigated and decided by the local D.C. Superior
Court.

The government moved to dismiss the petitions on the

ground that jurisdiction to consider the claims was removed
by 23 D.C. Code§ llO(g).

.

I

It provides:

"An application for a writ of
habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner
who is authorized to apply for relief
by motion pursuant to this section
shall not be entertained by the
Superior Court or by any Federal or
State court iffit appears that the
applicant has ailed to make a motion
for relief under this section .QJ.:_:tha..t.
th~L~h.1 perj.or __ C(?u~t has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the
remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention." ( r ... ,.k .; ):~ a ,ldt.-1)

In each case the District Court granted the motion to dismiss.
The Court of Appeals,~ bane, reversed over one dissent.

- 3 -

That court held that§ llO(g) was simply an
exhaustion statute, requiring that a prisoner not present
a claim by way of habeas corpus until he had first presented the claim to the local District of Columbia courts.
In so holding, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals simply
read out of the statute the words "or that the Superior

-

Court has denied him relief."

It did so because it thought

that otherwise serious constitutional questions would be
raised under the no suspension of the writ of habeas corpus
clause and the equal protection (due process) clause.

The

problems seemed to be that the Suspension Clause can
plausibly be construed to prevent Congress from denying
access to an Article III court in which to 'ti_11aterali:Yi attackJ
a criminal conviction; and that the equal protection clause
might, in any event, prevent Congress from providing access
to an Article III court to every convicted prisoner in the
•

country, except those convicted in the local District of
Columbia courts.

The court was not really able to find anything

in the congressional purpose to support its result, exs_gpt that

________________ ____________,___
---------~ .__

;;,..._

-

it could not believe Congress would deliberately create such
serious constitutional problems.

It concluded, therefore, that

~~

the statute was designed to make the situation in the District

of Columbia parallel the situation in the states -- availability
of Article III habeas corpus subject to an exhaustion requirement.

- 4 -

3.

CONTENTIONS:

means what it says.

--------

The SG argues that the statute

The statute tracks almost word for

word 28 U.S.C. § 2255 -- which provides for collateral
relief only before the same court before which the original
trial took place.

The SG says that the D.C. Circuit's

holding is for all intents and purposes a constitutional
holding masquerading as statutory construction.

The SG says

that the D.C. Circuit's "statutory" holding is wrong and
should be reversed.

I am not entirely clear whether the SG

wants us to remand for a "constitutional" decision or whether
he wants us to decide the constitutional question.

As I read

his petition, it is the latter which he wants.

0

The SG does not discuss the merits of the constitutional

} issue

in the petition.

He just says it is an important question.

-

Presumably he agrees with Judge Robb who dissented below --

.

reaching the constitutional issue.

He said that the writ of

habeas corpus is not suspended by this statute -- it simply is
made available only in courts manned by judges without life
tenure.

There is no equal protection problem.

Collateral relief

is available only in the court system in which the original conviction was obtained -- except where the original conviction was
in state court or courts martial.

Congress could rationally

conclude that in those instances the original court system was
more suspect than are the local District of Columbia courts,
which are created and supervised by the federal government.

•

.,..

'
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4.

DISCUSSION:

It seems to me that the SG is

right on the statutory construction issue.

I would think

that the judgment below is wrong enough on that issue so
that cert should be granted.

If it is, I would also guess

that the constitutional issue would not be reached; but
that the case would be remanded for a decision on that issue
•
jf\ ·H_
t ./:-~:,.; •I ~( 11pr,c L·
-- foregone though the conclusion on that issue may - b~\-----=---:...:_.
Possibly, however, this Court might agree with the SG that
the District of Columbia Circuit has in effect decided the
constitutional issue and cert could be granted to resolve it
here.

The suspension clause issue seems hard to me.

Court has always avoided it in the past.

C

States, 373 U.S. 1.

The

Sanders v. United

See The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189

U.S. 86, 23 S.Ct. 611, 47 L.Ed. 721 (1903); United States v.
Jung Ah Lung. 124 U.S. 621, 8 S.Ct. 663, 31 L.Ed. 591 (1888).
See also Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8, 28 S.Ct. 201,
52 L.Ed. 369 (1908).

The "equal protection" argument made by

resps seems weak.
There are responses.
2/4/76
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Motion to Vacate and Remand

No. 75-811
SUPERIOR GOUR T OF
DIST. OF COLUMBIA

"
~ ~p~
~ -----

t:>f~,1~~~

k

v.
PALMORE

S-6-~

~ ~

.
'- ~
. ? ~ 1-:--"
-'-~~ /
{f/--~~..J ~
t4,e • .&
4',,,~~G-ts.

~lf-1~ , ~..,~~)...,._,dA,~~

SUMMAR Y : On February 23, the Court granted cert to CADC to review
two separate~ bane judgments presenting the single question whether 23
Code

§ll0(g) renders federal habeas relief una.va-Hable o pe r sons incarcerated

pursuant to convic iorrs-i~

. Ct. and, if so, whether §ll0(g) is constitu-

This is the ?G's motion to vacate and remand in light of No. 74-1055,
Powell, as to the judgment in Palmore only.

(In the companion case,

Swain v. Pressley, resp prisoner sought collateral relief in USDC (D. C.) on
Sixth Amendment grounds; resp Palmore' s habeas petn presented a Fourth
Amendment claim. )

'
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CONTENTIONS OF THE SG:

The SG points out that Palmore' s search

and seizure claim was considered and rejected by the trial court and on appeal
to DCCA.

[This Court granted plenary review to consider Palmore' s contention

that he was entitled to be tried by an Art. III judge on the charge of committing
a felony in violation of the D. C. Code.

The Court affirmed, Palmore v. United

States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973 ); in fn. 6 at 397, the Court expressly noted its "denial
of the writ (of cert) with respect to (Palmore's) Fourth Amendment claim.

11

]

In

the federal habeas action, the DC dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, but the CA
reversed and remanded for a determination on the merits.
The SG, noting the above history and implicitly treating Palmore as a
"state prisoner,

11

argues that, in light of Stone v. Powell, Palmore would not be

entitled to the relief he seeks below regardless of the determination of this Court
on the jurisdictional question before it.

I

The SG suggests that the Court remand

Palmore to CADC for consideration of the disposition of Palmore' s habeas petn
in light of Stone.
DISCUSSION: Assuming that Stone v. Powell is applicable to federal habeas
proceedings initiated prior to the date of decision, that case does not operate as a
jurisdictional bar to relief.

Presumably, if the Court affirms in the instant case,

PalP1.ore would have the opportunity in DC to refute the claim that his Fourth
Amendment contention was fully and fairly reviewed on direct appeal or to make
whatever argument available to him to except his case from the Stone holding.

\

The

practical question presented by Palmore's cert petn is whether or not he will get
---.

,,.....,.__-----,

~

his day in federal court 0
There is no response.

PJN

..,...,

rf

-

hether he will prevail here .

•
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

No.
this

y

r a conversation with Mr. Rodak, I asked that
Superior Court v. Palmore, be relisted for
conference.

..·',,

.~.,

~

'

..

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER
WASHINGTON. D. C. 20001

>FFICE OF THE ASSOCIATE DEAN

October 13, 1976

Michael Rodak, Jr., Esquire
Clerk
Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D.C.
20543
Re:

Superior Court of the District of Columbia
v. Roosevelt F. Palmore, No. 75-811.

Dear Mr. Rodak:
Enclosed is the formal letter outlining our position with
regard to the pending motion to vacate and remand in Superior
Court v. Palmore, No. 75-811. While I did not think it was
appropriate to include a further fact in a formal statement of
position, I wanted you to know that I was confined in bed with
hepatitis during almost the entire month of September. For
that reason, I was unable to file a formal response to the
Government's motion in a timely fashion.
I sincerely regret
any inconvenience to you or to the Court which the absence of
such a response may h}l-ve caused.
With appreciation for your consideration and courtesy,
I am,

Enclosure:

FFF/11

As stated above.

'

.

,..
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER
WASHINGTON. D. C. 20001

OFFICE OF THE ASSOCIATE DEAN

October 13, 1976

Michael Rodak, Jr., Esquire
Clerk
Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D.C.
20543
Re:

Superior Court of the District of Columbia
v. Roosevelt F. Palmore, No. 75-811.

Dear Mr. Rodak:
Confirming our earlier telephone conversations, this is
to advise you that respondent ("P almore ") will not oppose the
pending motion filed by the Solicitor General to vacate the
judgment and remand this case to the United States Court of
Appeals for further consideration in light of Stone v. Powell,
_U.S .
(1976).

J

Palmore's application for a writ of habeas corpus alleged
violations of Fourth. Amendment rights and nece~sarily brought
into consideration the availability of the post-conviction writ
in such circumstances. The judgment of the Court of Appeals
directs the district judge to decide the merits of Palmore's
Fourth Amendment claims.
In view of this Court's holding in
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1 969 ), neither of the
parties seriously briefed or argued before the Court of Appeals
the issue of whether the post-conviction writ will lie in the
circumstances of Palrnoreis case, and that court relied solely
"·
on Kaufman when it directed the District . Court
to proceed to a
determination of the Fourth An'.2ndment issues involved. After
this Court had granted the petition for writ of certiorari in
this case, it handed down its decision in Stone v. Powell and
further explicated the principles announced in Kaufman and which
govern disposition of post-conviction claims for relief involving
Fourth Amendment claims.
In these circumstances, and after
consultation with members of the Solicitor General's staff , we
advised the Government and your office that Palmore would not
oppose the pending motion to vacate and remand for further
consideration. We did so in the belief that it was altogether

Michael Rodak, Jr., Esquire

-

October 13, 1976

2 -

appropriate to afford the United States Court of Appeals an
opportunity to consider in the first instance a potentially
dispositive issue which it had not considered seriously
debatable when the appea l was decided prior to issuance of this
Court's Stone decision.

1::z1 J1i ~
1

Frank F. Flegaff
Attorney for Respondent

~.
;'I'.

cc:

The Solicitor General

FFF/11

1·
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BOBTAIL BENCH MEMO
To:

Justice Powell

From:
Re:

Date:

12/10/76

Tyler Baker
Swain v. Pressley, No 75-811

~ ~/~w.•1c'-.ly~(;-;
Both because the briefs in this case are quite good and because
statutory construction arguments are difficult to compress, this
memo will lay out the basic framework of the two arguments, Xg«X
augmenting that framework with appropriate citations to the briefs
and my reactions.
At this stage in the litigation this case llX presents a problem
.
o f statu t;;!J _:;PStru:!,1on;

.
. ,.l _
. t he
t h e constitution
issue concerning

Suspension Clause is present only to the extent that it informs the
approach to the statutory construction.

--

At issue Dis 23 D.C. Code

llO(g), which provides as follows:
"An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a
prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion
pursuant to this section shall not be entertained by the
Superior Court or bfi anr Federal or State court if it ap¥ears
that the applicantasailed to make a motion for relie under
this section or that the Superior Court has denied him relief,
unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is XX inadequate
or ineffective to test the legality of his detention."
(Emphasis Xlill added.)
I

The SG relies on the plain meaning of the words emphasized above.
Despite the apparently unambiguous meaning of the words, the SG does
4.rtyf erence to 1 egis
. 1 ative
·
h istory
·
· incorrect.
·
not argue t h atAre
is

He does

argue
, that CADC XKK asked the wrong questions in conducting the
examination of the legislative history.

The SG argues that XX CADC

was incorrect to read the second phrase of §llO(g) out of the statute
because of silence or XM.X ambiguity in the legislative history.

I

SG's

Brief, at 29.

The SG contends that the appropriate approach in XMKX

this case is as follows:
"[The Court should not ask] whether the pertinent extrinsic
materials demonstrate that 'Congress clearly intended' (Pet. App.
27a) the full jurisdictional consequences of Section ll0(g),
but rather whether the legislative history is so manifestly inconsistent~ with the legislation itself as to warrant the
extraordinary conclusion that XXX giving effect to the second
clause of that section would negate rather XXX than promote
the Congressional will." SG's Brief, at 30.
The SG recognizes that it is appropriate to construe legislation so
as to avoid constitution questions, but argues that the construction
used to avoid the problem must be "fairly possible."
31.

l

SG's Brief at

with
The SG findsHX in the legislative history no inconsistency/HliX~K

his suggested reading of the statute.

The disputed section is part

of a general 1970 reform of them D.C. court system designed to increase
the efficiency of the system. There was XHXlili a total transfer of
to_ t"-t.. f\eVJ foe.a.I C.01.tt'f-S , - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1::._cal J urisdic '0-ot;f and fhe ro1 e of § 110 is to insulate the Article
III courts from collateral involvement in such local criminal litigation
---

...

~

,,,,,....__

¾la

in duplication of the collateral proceedings in the Superior Court.
Although Congress did analogize the new D.C. courts to the state systems,
the analogy is not perfect.

The local judges, while lacking Article
J.or- IS yUA.r f-~v-~S.
III status, are nominated by the President and confirmed by the SenateA

The SG draws support from the fact that §110 is patterned on 28 U.S.C.

I

§2255.
_.......,

Section 2255 is clearly not only an exhaustion of remedies

provision;

rather, it provides XMM a complete, self-contained substitute

for habeas corpus.

The SG UXK asks why Congress would use §2255 as

a model for a law which, if resps are correct, was intended to have such

,

a different effect from §2255.

w,·t-~

The SG also points out, -j:0.Agreat effect,

[ that §2255 ~K~HKX requires that persons convicted by Article Ia

.
W\A.~e t-i\eir c.o IIJ-e.ro.l tA...tl~jt .s by ~ot ":i"
MX territorial courtsA+
I I
hr to those courts. llKl:IX. Although
that problem has not apparently been litigated on a constitutional
basis, it raises the same question as ~MKDM raised here.

The absence

rnf :IDqiH debate a b o u t X K l i l i ~ J §110 may be explained by the
fact that Congress presumed it constitutional because of the previous
similar treatment of territorial courts. XKK SG's Brief, at 48 and
n. 27.

The

Xi

SG MlilXXXMXKIM also points out KM« that under the CADC

interpretation, habeas petitions may be filed in the MtKK~XK districts
in which persons convicted in the D.C. courts are confined. One of
,.lu... c..ko.tl t.~.,1e j
the purposes of §2255 was to channel A b ) . " 1s XUX~Qk through
the courts of conviction, and the same point applies here ••

Finally,

the SG distinguishes those cases relied upon by resps wherfhe KMHXX
Court interpreted statutes so as to avoid the question of the Suspension
Clause.

The cases either involved a greater infringement on KX habeas

corpus or Kk~X~~ less explicit statutory provisions.

See SG's Brief,

at 49-52.
The SG also goes into considerable detail about the XfilfKXIlfIKJX~X
A.9rf.L$

Xlili

underlying constitutionalijX question.

He~m::;1;11aa.

with Judge Robb's

dissent in essence, arguing that the problem here is answered

~;----~e

by Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, in which the Court held that
there was no problem in being convicted in the E~ District by a
non-Article III judge.

Assuming that the fact that non-Article III

judges would hear the §110 motions, and assuming that the lack of
11

.
. d ges ' tenure an d sa 1ary resu 1 ts in
· a d iminution
• •
•
protection
o f sue h JU

11

of the right of HX habeas corpus, the SG argues that there is still no
It

•

II

suspension.

SG's XX~K Brief, at 59.

Using history, the SG argues that

there would be no constitutional problem if habeas corpus were pared

Ii ~;tJ-10 t\ to

! v.e.s+,·of\.i.

back to its original~ jurisdictionaII\

I

1; 811

He notes that this

case:KX does not involve that problem because the scope of issues that
can be raised HMK~ under §110

covers all of present-day habeas corpus.

:J

The equal protection argument is XKKX answered by the assertion that
there is not ~Q right to litigate in XHX any particular tribunal.
Resps ~X rely on the arguments used by CADC.

They would read

§ll0(g) as nothing more than an exhaustion provision.

----~ ,. , -

--

'---==-=-=

.............__

~

Under their

theory the purpose of the XKKXX statuteKX was to codify a previously
vague, common law ~~XKXXK power of collateral review.

Responding

to the SG's argument, resps admit that improving efficiency was a
motivating factor in the 1970 reform, but

X~Wli

argue that there

is not evidence that Congress XHMtiMXXfilUQ!XHXK:Kfilf thought of collateral
attack as being part of the problem of backlog.
n. 15.

Resps' Brief, at 18

Resps point to the limited legislative history in which the

only point that is clearly made is a reference to~ the previously
unsettled, IKMlflfKK:KX inherent~ power of review.

They relj on the

absence of statements recognizing the effect of the statute that is
now advanced by the SG, putting XMK~ this absence of reaction in
comparision to strong reactions to other provisions contemplating
a cut-back in habeas corpus.

Resps Brief, at 23 n.21.

Resps rely

heavily on the analogy to the %KMX relationship that exists between
federal and state courts, drawing on the analogy to those systems in
the discussions of the 1970 reform of the District court system.
From the pattern of the statute as a wholeJthey see an intent by EMM~K
oj,

Co&A rs<.,

th.,.. ,~..t.."siu,. • ;"<.' "''t' ,l_ ~t.

r-u"'-t

~o l\al,eu '"'

Jd,,. ..,

Congress to emulate that relationship for the District.A XMX In this

(otert.

same vein, they argue that there were no amendments here to the
basic~ jurisdictional provisions of Title 28.

Resps answer the

argument about habeas petitions being brought in districts in which
D.C. prisoners are confined, by referring to an understanding that such
cases will be X ~ transferred

}IX

back to the D.C. for action.

Resps spend considerably XX less IMX~X energy on the underlying
constitutional

ijHKK

question;

for purposes of interpretation of the

statute there can be no doubt that there is a problem which might
JKX justify an interpretation XH which KDMIK eliminates the need
to address the question.

Resps argue that the Article III protections

are important enoughXX to justify a conclusion that this statute
would amount to a suspensiion.

They argue, without much force, that

the local D.C. judges are X%XIKJ likely to be more responsive to
the parochial concerns of their locality.

Resps' RI~K Brief, at 49.

Resps do not have much of an answer to the SG's point about this
same problem existing for §2255 and territorial courts.

They state

that the Suspension Clause applies to current HKifil!Hli unincorporated
liX ter~itortes only by legislative grace, so the full force of the
S&-l&~~StOt'\

LIA.~~~

A pfoblem cannot arise.

Resps' Brief, at 54 n. 53

Discussion:
Resps have IMK«ll~ identified some problems.

I certainly would

have expected more discussion of the effect claimed by the SG than
there is.

There is a X~XMll traditionXX of avoiding interpretations

that require addressing the Suspension Clause.

But, the statutory

-

language here is plain. At most the X~I legislative history fails to
'....
KH support pos it ively the apparent effect oft-he language of the statute.
I do not see any inconsistency, and the fact that §2255 does seem to
have this same effect for territorial courts is important.

Despite the

fact that 8 good judges reached the result, I do not think that this
legislative history is nearly strong enough to justify t«i ignoring the
language of the statute.
I do not think that the Court should decide the constitutional
question.

-

I would remand so that the Court will have a good, full

consideration below HK~ on which to draw.

I tend, however, to agree

with XH~XHg Judge Robb that the first Palmore is at least very

s

of the result here.
in many respects.

The

District of Columbia is sui generis

~~X

t"e..

I do not see t~atAdifference in the Article III

protections in this context a

HX~\ufficient to justify the conclusion

thatXHM habeas has been suspended by this statute.
\
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~u:p-rtmt QJoud cf tqt ~ttitth ~tatts
~aslrmghtn, ~- QJ. 2!1~Jl.,
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

March 8, 1977

Re:

75-811 - Swain v. Pressley

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

Enclosed is concurring opinion in the above.
I may refine it somewhat.

.§u:p-unu {!Jllltrl af tlrt ~ h .§faug
~ru. fyi:ngLm. ~. ~ 20,5'!-;l
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

March 8, 1977

75-811, Swain v. Pressley
Dear John,
I am glad to join your opinion for
the Court in this case.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

~u:p-unu ~curt of tlrt ~nittb ~tatts
~asfymgfon. ~- ~- ZOgiJ.I..'.3
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR .

RE: No. 75-811

March 11, 1977

Swain v. Pressley

Dear John:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stevens
cc: The Conference

.:§npunu <!Jami: ttf tfrt ~ t b .:§tattg
jiasqmgton. J. QJ. 2.llffe~~
CHAM BERS O F

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUI S T

March 11, 1977

Re:

No. 75-811 - Swain v. Pressley

Dear Chief:
Please join me in your concurring opinion.
Sincere~~

, Jfe_

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

{!Jqu:d it£ flrt ~~ ~htf:tg
J)'Mfrittghm. ,. {!J. 2.0ffeJl.'

~tt:pTffltt

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

March 11, 1977

Re:

No. 75-811 - Swain v. Pressley

Dear John:
Please join me.
Sincerely,
,.·,
<.

Mr. Justice Stevens
Copies to Conference

··,

,,

'-' ,:%,u-p-rtutt

<!Jmtrl cf ±4t ~niuh ~ntltg
~ii.glyi:ttgfott, ~. <!J. 2.llp>l,.;l

CHAMBERS OF

March 16, 1977

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

✓
Re:

No. 7 5-811 - Swain v.

Pressley

Dear Chief:
Please join me in the recirculation today of your opinion
concurring in part and concur ring in the judgment.

Sincerely,

/u.l

I

The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference

'·

'·

16, 1977

No. 75-811

Swain v. Pressley

Dear John:
Please join me in your opinion for the Court.

In view of the Chief's concurring opinion, I think I
will add something along the following lines:
"I concur in the opinion of the Court. In
view, however, of the concurrence filed today by
the Chief Justice, I write merely to make clear
that I do not read Part II of the Court's opinion
as being incompatible with the views I have
expressed previously with respect to the nature
and scope of habeas corpus. Scknecklotb v.
Buatamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250 (Powell, J., concurring)."
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stevens
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

,.$,, .. •· ., .. _ .,,,.

.§u:prtmt ~curt cf tqt 1Jlnittb ~tatu
'l'ITasJrmgtcn. IQ.

~-

20giJ!'

CHAMBERS OF

March 16, 1977

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re: No. 75-811, Swain v. Pressley

Dear John:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

T. M.
Mr. Justice Stevens
cc: The Conference

to, !be Chi•t Just1oe

Kr, Juettoa Brenn~

Ir.
Mr.
11.r.
Vr,

Juet1oe Stewart
Just1M White
.rust 'l ce brshall
Justice Blaomun

Mr. ,JtJr;itioe R•'i'llnqu11t

Kr.

~T1i :,'t1ce

Stevens

from: Mr. Justi ce Po,ell
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATffl
No. 75-811

C. L. Swain, Superintendent,
Lorton Reformatory,
Petitioner,

v.
Jasper C.. Pressley.

On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit.

'[March -, 1977]
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1

\

MR, JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I concur in the opinion of the Court. In view, however, of
the concurrence filed today by THE CHIEF JUSTICE,, I write
merely to make clear that I do not read Part II of the Court's
opinion as being incompatible with the views I have expressed
previously with respect to the nature ancl scope of habeas
corpus. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 250
(1973) (POWELL, J., concurring).
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